Barrack Obama has previously hinted in September 2009 that he would revise the plans for a missile base in Poland, but someone had clearly managed to persuade him to pursue Bush’s plans. However, it was not a valid argument Russia Today had about the United States having so many missile bases around which could shoot down the Iranian missiles because the Iranian missiles would big circle navigate over northern latitudes (latitudes or west-east stretches) to reach the United States.
It may also be that the Americans will be forced to shoot down Iranian nuclear missiles over the Russian sky. Intercontinental nuclear weapons missiles have high parabolic trajectories and travel at a speed of 3 miles per second (6 km/s). A missile with only a kinetic effect can not easily be remote controlled in its parabolic trajectory against a target in its highest altitude that travels maybe as much as 45 degrees in the opposite direction of an enemy missile at a speed of mach 17,6 (approximately 13,000 miles per hour or 22,000 km/h) towards an American multi-million people city.
If we assume that the United States would be willing to sacrifice a substantial portion of their satellites due to the Nuclear EMP effect, in exchange for saving a big US city. A nuclear anti-nuclear missile would have to detonate as close to the enemy nuclear missile as 550 yards (500 meters) in order to stop it in its deadly trajectory. Fortunately, the American Anti-Nuclear missile CE-II Exo (Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle) has only a kinetic effect.
The Americans themselves said that they had technical difficulties with the intended missile shield in Europe.
Interestingly, Putin has not mentioned anything about that US anti-nuclear weapons missiles in the future from Poland could shoot down their targets over the Baltic countries or over Russia to intercept a hypotethic Iranian missile with its aim London. For example, from Romania or Bulgaria, you would have to shoot down an Iranian ballistic missile with its aim London over central Sweden or Norway. If the nuclear weapons missile cross the Barents Sea with its aim New York it has to be shot down approximately over Greenland. Whether the target is London or New York, the nuclear missile has to big circle navigate over parts of Russia.
It is probably so that the US missile base must be located in the Czech Republic or southern Poland, and that the US Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle then intercepts an Iranian nuclear missile with its goal New York over Greenland. Unless the nuclear missile crosses the North Sea with its target London, which in this case allows the downing of the nuclear missile over the Baltic or Russia.
The power of two more or less frontally colliding missiles partially level each others out. Plutonium exposed to friction and heat becomes strongly radioactive and radioactive material may contaminate large areas on our soil, if and when the Iranian missile is shot down in its trajectory on its way to London. That is if the plutonium does not burn up in the atmosphere.
Any trajectory missiles are detected at an early stage with e.g. satellites with IR-sensors for them to be able to intercept enemy missiles in time.
An American AN/TPY-2 ground radar is also in operation at Kürecik since 2012 in eastern Turkey, and it is an early missile warning radar station with a range of up to 620 miles (1,000 km). AN/TPY-2 is usually combined with THAAD, which has to shoot down its target ”close to its belt”. THAAD is a tactical army system that is developed to shoot down short and medium-range ballistic missiles in the descending phase. But THAAD will not be able to shoot down intercontinental nuclear missiles. An AN/TPY-2 radar with its 620 miles range can not detect objects any further away than the southern Caspian Sea.
A Space-based IR sensor is required. The sensors for an interceptor launched from Poland that are to be used against nuclear targets travelling over the Greenland area must have outstanding features, since they do not even know which US city is the target. Speeding up to the nuclear missile at an angle of about 30 degrees from behind will not be easy to achieve. A mid-course radar is supposed to be located near the American missile base in southern Poland or in the Czech Republic. The interceptor must be programmed before starting. You must first know what altitude the nuclear missile is flying at and at what speed and at what stage it is in its trajectory and in exactly what direction it is flying, so that the Anti-Nuclear missile knows where to intercept it.
The Americans have less than 6 minutes of warning and preparation time if the American missile base is located in southern Poland while the Iranian is located near the Caspian Sea in the North of Iran. The Iranian nuclear missile must big circle navigate. Then the missile must be shot down somewhere over Greenland’s east coast or over the North Arctic Ocean.
The systems used for the European Missile Shield must be the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) with an Interceptor (GBI) called CE-II, as well as a land-based version of SM-3. The SM-3 is very small for an ABM, about 3,300 pounds (1,500 kg). But an interception of an Iranian missile with the SM-3 will not happen over the North Arctic Ocean, it completely falls outside of the missile’s performance capability. But with a CE-II you can shoot down an Iranian missile that has a trajectory over northern Europe, and shoot them down over the Baltics or Russia.
The CE-II can also intercept by flying over the nuclear missile and ”push” it away from its path from behind. You can read the following online (Wikipedia): ”On April 30, 2014, the Government Accountability Office issued a report stating that the system may not be operational any time soon because ”its development was flawed”. It says the GBI missile is ”capable of intercepting a simple threat in a limited way.” ”
With ”In a limited way”, they are likely to mean that the angle can not be too big to be able to hit the target either from the rear or from the front. The CE-II interceptor requires assistance from ground radar and space-based sensors against more complex and sophisticated targets. The CE-II interceptor has an Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV).
If the Russians try to wipe out the ground facilities in Europe with cruise missiles, I do not see how they could manage without knowing in advance when the Iranians send their nuclear weapons missiles against the United States or London.
Russia and China jointly agreed in March 2013 that they should coordinate their reaction to the United States plans to expand their missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region. The statement follows the United State’s declaration on March 16 of 2013 by Defense Minister Chuck Hagel, to abolish the construction of the fourth phase of the Missile Defense Shield in Europe in favor of a missile defense shield in Alaska, which would provide the Americans with coverage to resist a North Korean nuclear attack. One of the reasons the Americans intended to scrap phase 4, in other words the intercontinental missile shield in Europe, are the technical difficulties.
What signals do you figure that Obama was sending to Greenland, the Baltic states, Sweden and Norway as he gave a green light to building a missile shield that would effectively shoot down missiles over selected countries, considering that radioactive material would spread over wide areas, to spare London from a nuclear blast?
Or do you think the whole attempt was to keep our countries in the dark about nuclear stuff spreading over selected countries in case the US were to shoot down a nuclear missile?
Note; it is impossible to beforehand determine exactly where to shoot down a missile. The interception point depends on not controllable circumstances. So to say that ”we would shoot it down over the Baltic Sea” is not a valid argument because they do not know in advance exactly where a missile is going to be shot down.
Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden