The importance of strategic maskirovka should not be underestimated, but I personally see it as a second-rate protection measure. I’m not saying I’m ignoring it and never would agree to it, but I’m reluctant to introduce pure strategic maskirovka and prefer open cards. It is probably a national trait.
Maskirovka at a tactical and operational level is a completely different matter. For Swedish conditions it could be about camouflage, heat camouflage, heat dissipation, invisibility hoods by systems that can imitate the surrounding temperature, and for operational level the spreading of airbases and aircontrol centers and the like. I am entirely for that. But it is symptomatic that the only central and overall strategic plan where the Allies proved to be significantly superior in WWII were during the initial invasion of Normandy, and the planning preceding Normandy.
What preceded the invasion in the form of a major deception with two smokescreens called Operation Bodyguard and Operation Fortitude, however, was not a result of superiority in strategic thinking, but a sneaking and shuffling of the cards and pure luck for the Allies side during the planning, if you ask me.
It was because of the enormous magnitude of the deception, that it was pure luck that they succeeded. A single unfortunate observation by a German agent or by a traitor could have sunk parts of the plan. It didn’t make it any less cunning. It was all about masking, dummies, deceptive traffic and fake signaling.
I also mention that deceptive bombings, staniol tape felling (also called Chaff or Window) to deceive radar systems and large scale air drops of rubber dolls were carried out during D-day from bases in the south-east of England to the Calais area in France. Masking, dummies, deceptive traffic and maybe fake signaling were just forms of regular strategic maskirovka. But the fake signaling costed little in energy, manpower and working hours and was therefore well worth it.
Fake signaling can be switched on to true signaling at a certain point in time or action, and you may be exposed at a later stage of an invasion. The deceptive bombings, the staniol tape felling and the rubber dolls were operational maskirovka and were all justified. The Allies took the Germans by surprise on D-day as they intended to do.
The Germans were themselves devoted to strategic maskirovka on Normandy’s beaches. This made the Allied strategic Maskirovka pointless. Sure enough, the Allies sometimes landed were they could not achieve their intended goal because the target wasn’t there, and in some cases they would land at the wrong place or in dangerous places like the beach strip named Omaha.
Do you think it is meaningless to divide the meaning of Maskirovka into strategic, tactical and operational like I did here? If yes, please motivate your standpoint.
If you think it is meaningful, do you agree on that it was pointless for the Allies to pursue their strategic maskirovka? If no, please motivate your standpoint.
Roger M. Klang, defense political Spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden